

5. Human Resources.

Many scholars, experts in foreign affairs, diplomats, historians, strategists, and even economists agree upon the fact that the former division of the World into two blocs of countries, each roughly called East and West, brought some benefits with its fears of a generalized nuclear war. Indeed, the end of the Soviet Union brought down with it the reassuring notions of friends and foes in international politics, which had theretofore allowed us to locate our landmarks, to know who's who, or "almost" in a few particular instances. Not only the post-Cold War period failed to bring any peace, but it thrown the World in the eerie dark waters of a Dantean marsh, in which no one can possibly ascertain the intentions and mood of the massive and undetermined shapes moving under its surface. In 1991, in France, the worse stole the victory to the better, contrary to everyone's hope. This seemed to happen overnight, by "the fault of the First Gulf War," the French media told to the masses, accompanied by unexplainable shortages of vegetable oil, sugar, and pasta, between some other vital commodities *a priori* unrelated and for a little while.

Then journalists and some thinkers began to say that the World was undergoing a deep change, which characterized in France as rampant collective "schizophrenia". At that time, the metaphor was coined for wants of the term "political correctness" that was not yet as popular as it is today, lest no one was daring enough to go as far as dubbing the illness "doublethink". "Cognitive dissonance" was too sophisticated to the masses or its possible causes too obvious to the taste of some.^[88] A few years later, the masses were clear-sighted enough to see that the World leaders of the post-Cold War all clung to a fantasy of universal peace and goodwill around a common table under which kicks were raining.

In countries the most involved in this "New Cold War" supposed to exist only in the most fertile imaginations until about 2017, ruled civilians are the most exposed. They are those who have to suffer the consequences of constant political denial and media self-censorship. They must often receive the hardest blows while they are forced to say that they are acts of God, under the threat of a charge of delusion or conspiracy theorist. A side effect of the "war that did not exist" spread maliciously further and deeper in the society of ordinary citizens, and crippled it: there was no reason to limit trade and other exchanges with foes, since they were "allies," "partners," and even "friends". Everywhere in the World, the symptoms of the schizophrenia, mild at first, worsened to reach the more concerning stage of severe "paranoid schizophrenia". In fact, the apparent mental illness was the visible side of a desperate self-defense against foes and threats that everyone was forbidden to point out and name openly, thus fueling a hypocrisy accepted as a new paradigm, out of sorry and silent resignation. Indeed, the end of the Cold War caused disappointment, and today we do not watch documentaries on the fall of the Berlin Wall with the joy and relief of those who destroyed it, but with nostalgia as the thrilling hope for the bright days to come for long is gone.

Today, in a number of occidental countries, it is a known and even commented fact that people tend to no longer flock and stick together as they still did barely more than twenty years ago, to oppose the unsettling new threats of after the Cold War. They feel forced to split to flee uncertainty and dangers; the fear of the neighbor is spreading in Western countries. It is little exaggeration to say that they "suicide" socially. *Divide ut regnes* (Divide and rule), Caesar was quoted as saying, which byword Napoleon Bonaparte took up and put into practice not only in France, but also in all countries his troops conquered.

Since that same year 1991, France expanded increasingly her range of actions in domestic intelligence and counterintelligence in order to monitor and to minimize the ever-possible consequences of foreign businesses settling on her soil to tout and sell their goods and services. One of those methods is to encourage or compel those companies to recruit as much as possible its executives and employees among French nationals, under threats of stringent trade union regulations, actions, and strikes set and organized under whatever pretenses. When those foreign companies refuse to comply or just drag their feet, the domestic intelligence forces raise the pressure by resorting to [agitprop](#), [black propaganda](#), and disinformation coming as false motives, accusations of "xenophobia," pretenses of "unwarranted and ethically unacceptable refusals to go by the rules and culture of the host country," real or alleged poor work conditions and tax dodging, and so on, and on. Enormous taxes, administrative controls of all sorts, oddly frequent or even permanent to the point of hassle accompany the aggressions. The methods target U.S. companies having activities in France, especially and unambiguously.

Since the early 2000s, Amazon replaced Microsoft as a priority target of the DGSE, especially from October 2011, when the former company exported the concepts of the Kindle book and self-publishing at no cost to this country. Therefore, the State and its intelligence community had ever been wary never to let unknown people publishing and selling books, still less to let an American company introducing them on an equal footing with authors that the cultural elite and the mainstream media had established for centuries in France, alone and customarily. This, indeed, was perceived as a provocation, an unmistakable evidence of deliberate interference in French domestic affairs, a clear act of [information warfare](#).

In short, it is a matter of compelling the unbending private company of the enemy country, or that of a “disgraced” one, not to also importing its culture because it would be a “deadly disease”. As the reader can easily imagine, with this obligation to recruit as many indigenous workers as possible, it is understood that informants of various public services are among them. Coincidence (?) makes that a distant and young relative of mine worked for Coca-Cola France for a while; I quickly understood she had been anti-American indoctrinated before she actually was *planted* in this company. Eventually, she was moved to Suntory beverages, to her relief, she said. Spies make spy-families as a contagious disease does, alas.

Heavy fines and exorbitant taxes are not the annoyances the foreign company should dread in France, however. The most potent disturbances are the trade unions and their shop stewards, agents provocateurs, henchmen, and snitches, each endowed legally with a right to dispute in any business anything does not fit strictly the rules and regulations written in small characters in the 3,762 pages of the French Labor Code (Code du Travail). Those learn how to influence and to bully employees who are not yet trade union registered, how to set them against CEOs and their managerial staffs, and how to breed discontent and to sow dissent in any business. This is another way for the schizophrenia of international relations to rush into the daily lives of ordinary employees, and to contaminate those who resist the peer pressure that urges them to rally leftist activism. As a result, all those people who just wanted to make a living and to live peacefully find themselves trapped in a professional atmosphere of reciprocal distrust, constant pressure, maddening office conspiracies, and infighting. Then the disease spreads outside of the workplace, inevitably.

The situation of the foreign company under the maddening yet denied surveillance of the host country spreads to French private businesses either, for the latter are thought “likely to be penetrated and spied on by the enemy,” reciprocally. Regardless whether the foreign company having activities on the French soil is no more than an ordinary competitor, a cover activity, or a front indeed, it does not change anything to the suspicion. That is why the French domestic intelligence apparatus wants to have informants and watchdogs in French companies either, exactly as the 2d Division of the old French police did 140 years ago, when the scapegoats of the moment were Prussia and England.

Today, the motto justifying the quixotic underground resistance against the dreadful foreign windmills is “protection of the economic and technological [heritage](#)”.^[89] For long, the provision has been coined and made an important additional mission in counterintelligence and counter-interference. Of course, the protection of the French industrial and economic heritage, by resorting to an enormous network of informants *planted* in it, concerns only those whose activities and expertise are deemed likely to interest foreign competitors, and those identified as [OIVs](#) or / and that fall in the [SAIV](#) category.^[90] The problem is that the latter criteria make them innumerable in the end. One “natural” solution the French intelligence community found out to guarantee the safety of French companies is to arrange the placing of ex-military in managerial positions, justified by *formal aims* saying, “The best experience in management is military”.

On one hand, it often proves tricky to impose an ex-serviceman in a civilian company, since experience proved that it is not that simple to implement this provision in public services, already. For example, the French Navy sends mails to the main energy provider EDF repeatedly, begging to hire its servicemen on early retirement in priority. On the other hand, countless French private companies have one executive at least with membership in a French liberal masonic lodge, which makes up for the safety provision, already. A significant percentage of MSE’s owners and managers in France is liberal Freemasons. Thus, the protection of the national economic and industrial heritage is relatively secure, “the hush-hush way” and at no cost.

One could say that the situation, turning Orwellian today, breeds more paranoia in the already existing schizophrenia. Not in the medical sense the terms convey, of course, the reader understands it, but together as an overwhelming evidence of a pervading spy mania and of an obsession with

conspiracy theories. The excess cripples the French economy and public services, symptomatic of a state of war, be it silent and non-lethal, in a time of official peace.

In passing, knowing the existence of those tens of thousands of informant workers provides the reader with a clue of the formidable extent of State surveillance and interference in private business in France, and of the nature of the ultimate ramifications and far-reaching capacities of the [domestic intelligence](#) apparatus in this country. They are the furthest from a tree trunk made up of a few intelligence agencies under the command of the Ministry of Defense. The big branches and roots underground are the other of the ministries of the Interior, Economy and Finance, and Justice, shaping together an omnipotent and omnipresent spy machine that is not supposed to exist either. The liberal Freemasonry locates everywhere in the massive and complex body; we will see how in the [chapter 16](#). The metaphorical comparison is my own, since the intelligence apparatus in France pictures itself sometimes as the all-seeing-eye, and some other times as a spider since since eavesdropping has been made common practice, whereas the public for long sees it as an octopus. This introduction, despite its length, yet could not possibly allow the reader to figure out the size and ramifications of the tree; it will claim the complete reading of the Part II of this book. Before the teaching of this knowledge begins, he must first discover the nature of its substance. Below is a description of the main actors and components in human resources of the French intelligence apparatus, starting down from informants, snitches, and unconscious agents, up to the director of the DGSE, since this agency is its sap.

CLANDESTINE HUMAN RESOURCES

The *mouchard* (informant) is the name given to the “little snitch”. He often is an ordinary citizen with no training nor any skill in intelligence, who supplies information deemed of interest, spontaneously or on demand. In most instances, the *mouchard* does not really know who is and what is doing his correspondent. Exceptions of course are those who send mails to the agencies or public services of their fancies. On a case-by-case basis, the official or agent who collects such confidences leaves the *mouchard* with the plain liberty to assume whatever he wants of what he is doing and to whom he is confiding exactly. Very often, the *mouchard* takes himself to a game he imagined. Some believe they are transmitting valuable information to the police or to the internal revenue service or to an “influential acquaintance”. Or else, to a representative of his trade union, a journalist, a political party or ONG, or to a “fellow country-man” mistakenly confused as a foreign spy, in the case of the so-called “[false-flag recruitment](#)”. Nonetheless, *sensors* of this inferior category all long for a recognition of their little helps, even when they deny it: simple recognition of principle or small venal services returned, except of course those, numerous either, who do it under some threat.

In France, the intelligence communities and police services do not reward financially their informants and snitches, on the disingenuous pretense that “patriotism is not for sale”. The former may happen to pay foreign [sources](#) and agents abroad, but never for long as the first payment or any other kind of reward must be the treat of the blackmail to come. Many of those *sources* argue patriotism as they crave the consideration of those who are endowed with the extraordinary power to transform their tips in events. Those who gather the information that informants collect are never fooled, and they never rely on trust alone anyway. There are plenty of examples and anecdotes in this book telling about the psychological aspects and managerial practices of the French intelligence community; it is a rich field, full of surprises.

The *source* is this link of the chain of intelligence that is called hastily *agent*. Usually, the *source* holds a position that grants him regular or occasional access to information of interest, deserving to be called *intelligence*. *Source* is a name that may designate indifferently a second-rate technician in a factory, a prostitute, a police officer, a scientist, an employee in an intelligence agency, a colonel, or a minister. When a *source* is an employee in an intelligence agency, some call this individual a “mole,” whereas the DGSE calls him a *sous-marin*, or “[submarine](#),” but the term applies as well in the case of a senior public servant or military. The *source* serving from abroad, who generally is a native of the foreign country targeted, is given an evaluation note allowing to know at first glance the likely value of the intelligence he provides; that is to say, the credit he is given. The *source* abroad may be run either by an agent acting under the command of a [case officer](#), or by a case officer directly. Very exceptionally, senior intelligence executives, up to the Director of the DGSE, may want to handle a *source* personally if the intelligence he transmits is of extraordinary value, even though a rule forbids this, in theory. A *source* may also be a French national or a foreigner working in France (expatriate) in a foreign company or organization

(political, religious, or else) that is of interest to the DGSE, or he may be in whatever other capacity to report about matters of similar interest.

A *source* may act for various true reasons, and this point is of paramount importance in the eyes of the DGSE, for he is someone who betrays either his own party or country at the benefit of another, or / and who cheats on people who invested their trust in him for whatever other reason. Often the *source* considers he is not betraying anyone because he thinks “he is doing something good” for his country, the World or whatever, out of unselfishness and of some belief. Therefore, he often is an individual ideologically committed, or else he may be unaware to be a *source* because he believes he does no more harm than to confide in an individual he trusts: a friend, a relative, his lover, his boss, his labor union representative, his psychoanalyst, etc. The conditions of recruitment of a *source* are explained largely in this book, with true examples at times.

The *contact* (formerly called ***Honorable Correspondent–HC***) ranks higher than the *mouchard* and the informant in consideration, and even of the agent in many instances, for he acts out of patriotism, willingly and strictly, and he is fully conscious to do this in the service of his country. The job of the *contact* is not to spy on but to help occasionally, as described, below.

When in a foreign country, a *contact* may help an agent in various ways ranging from temporarily lending to him a vehicle, to arranging for him to meet with locals of interest, serving as *courier* to pass small amounts of money and instructions or else, to teaching him the fundamentals on local habits and customs of the host country.

A *contact* must not partake actively in spying activities, nor in anything that might be compromising at some point because his presence in a foreign country is very helpful. He is considered as an *asset*, but he does not have to cope with the rules and promiscuity of the DGSE. In most instances, a *contact* is a French national, native or foreign naturalized, who immigrated longtime ago and settled for good in a foreign country. Some took early retirement in a sunnier and calmer spot because they were fed off with life in France and their former activities that they found dull at some point. There, typically, they created a small business activity, a shop, bakery, restaurant, or the like, to make their livings and not to have to cope anymore with the agonies of subordination and commuterism.

Among those *contacts*, some succeed in their professional activities and they are making good money or even big money. Some others stay rather inactive and anonymous because they are content with their retirement pension; they play *pétanque* on Saturdays mornings with their fellow compatriots and locals. Some others immigrated with big money they made from selling their business in France, which comes as a retirement of a sort. *Contacts* of the latter kind, in particular, often are the most active and helpful, at least because they are smart, lively, and even streetwise generally, and so they are good in building networks of influential acquaintances in the host country.

Some worked full time formerly in the French intelligence community, and they were trusted enough to be left free to expatriate or were encouraged to do so on purpose. *Contacts* seldom are young people, therefore. They may provide useful and inconsequential *open source* intelligence, such as the general mood of the local population about an ongoing national election, popular gossips about particular issues, and the visible developments of a particular business located near the place where they live. Sometimes, they even managed to have good and friendly relations with the police!

As most *contacts* are French nationals, they often have relatives, acquaintances, and good friends who remained in France and with whom they chat regularly by telephone and on the Internet, and physically when they come back to France for a short vacation trip. One of the latter people is working with the DGSE or himself is a *contact* of this agency himself who remained in France. Otherwise, *contacts* may talk regularly by telephone with a close relative whose telephone line is tapped, so that they are even not aware to be in touch with the DGSE and to feed this agency with intelligence, or else they may assume this at least, which in English-speaking countries is a guilty attitude known as “willful blindness”—I guess because there is no French equivalent to this expression.

The *agent* (same orthography in French) is described in the *Lexicon* already, and often he appears in this book anyway.

The *Officier Traitant–OT* (case officer) oft-called “*traitant*” (handler), or “*mac*” in French intelligence slang, does not content himself with taking pieces of intelligence from his *sources* and agents. For one says that the case officer must “keep a tight rein” on them,^[91] exactly as if they were no better considered than dogs, and as dehumanized “weapons” in the DGSE, specifically. Indeed,

this agency sees its agents as “tool of war,” and therefore as *expendable* and replaceable individuals, [92] although this perception is not that true when the agent is an operative holding the privilege to have been trained thoroughly at a heavy cost. In all cases, a good case officer never must be or seem attached affectively to his agent(s), while he must lure him to believe that this aspect of their forced close relationship is “not quite true”. From the collective viewpoint of the DGSE, the value of a case officer is greater than that of his agent, yet this does not imply that the former cannot be expendable at some point.

In most instances, a case officer, although he is working under the direct orders of an insider called *contrôleur* (supervisor) in the DGSE, must preserve a credible cover activity for himself, which must not take all his time. That is why he often is a retiree, the holder of a fictitious position in a large company or public service, or an annuitant who receives his income from invested capital, real estate rents, life annuities, interest on capital or market income, etc.

In a large majority of instances, the French case officer is male, and he has a military background; thereof, the use of the word *officer* even when he was non-commissioned officer in the military. The DGSE is working hard to find out, select, and train female [case officers](#), either with the intent to run female agents, or males when they appear to better interact under female leadership. In any case, affective or sexual relationship between the case officer and his agent is forbidden. Male case officers, and recruiters alike, who run / recruit female agents and *sources*, and who are expected to be physically in touch with them, sometimes resort to the simple trick of claiming they are gay.

Though assimilated to an executive, a case officer does not necessarily have to complete higher education, yet he often has experience, past or active, in management. He also has been chosen to execute this very particular task because of his psychological profile, for which the ordinary and daily fulfillment of his work would seem impossible if not psychologically painful otherwise. Indeed, the dependable case officer must be an individual who does not attach to others, who has a weak empathy, and who never binds himself durably and sincerely of friendship with anybody. He often is a loner, yet he must not be an introvert. He must not be likely to feel any remorse for the psychological distress of the agents he handles. He is, in a large majority of instances not to say always, an unofficial full-time employee in intelligence who never goes to the headquarters. That is why his work’s meetings with his hierarchical superior, the *contrôleur* / supervisor, are always held in anonymous and neutral places or at his own place.

Often, the case officer did not have the chaotic existence that is the ordinary lot of [flying agents](#), agents, and snitches, or he held managerial positions regularly when he was an agent himself. He is an individual who always enjoyed discreet “protections,” because to be a case officer is a privilege from the collective point of view of the French intelligence community. The latter profile means that either he belongs to a bourgeois or prominent family, or / and that he showed faultless commitment to the French left-leaning political values and blind obedience in addition to his particular mindset.

For three reasons, a large majority of French case officers have membership in the main secret society, the [GODF](#), with the degree of Master Mason at minimum. The first of these reasons is that particular moral and political prerequisites condition the access to membership in the GODF, in addition to close examination until accessing the degree of Master Mason. When in the DGSE, accessing the latter masonic degree implies more and special ordeals that are in no way masonic, designed to put the loyalty and obedience of the candidate to the test. The second reason is that the masonic membership of a case officer allows easy, justifiable, and constant monitoring and control over his privacy, mindset, activities, and relationships, since he is not working in a DGSE building and under the permanent monitoring of the Security Service. The third reason is that GODF membership provides a case officer with an easier—but controlled—access to useful and professional connections he needs to perform in activities in human intelligence. Additionally, membership in the GODF is an effective protection against justice, and against the possibility that a disgruntled agent or someone else attempts to expose publicly the mischievous character he truly is.

However, since the case officer is an unofficial employee of the DGSE enjoying an exceptional freedom of movement, this agency must keep some effective ploy in reserve against him, just in case. A serious threat must be brandished against him at any time, should he do a grave fault or refuse to serve any longer for reasons of his own. Anyway, both the intelligence community, the Freemasonry, and a supervisor warn the case officer freemason on the consequence of the latter possibility. Regardless of how privileged he may be, the case officer must submit to a certain amount of stress, as all other agents, employees, and executives do—the reader will see why, in a next chapter.

The *barbouze* belongs to a particular category of agents that actually is the French state mafia under the command of the DGSE via its intelligence officers. Did the reader ever wonder about whether France would have a mafia of her own? I present it now, and I will do again with true anecdotes, in other chapters of this book. A large majority of *barbouzes* are ex-military in special units, and more particularly in a regiment of the [COS](#) or in the [Service Action](#), which are about a same body, actually. To understand who the *barbouzes* are exactly, and what their typical profile is, first it is necessary to trace their historical origins.

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, many free-fighters of the Resistance were recruited by the [DGSS](#), the agency ancestor of the DGSE, created by Jacques Soustelle, a personage I will name again in the next chapters. After this agency was re-named [DGER](#) in October 1944, former hero of the Resistance André Dewavrin aka “Colonel Passy” was tasked to reform this second intermediate and short-lived agency. The latter event happened in early 1946, when Dewavrin purged the new French foreign intelligence service of a large number of unfit employees, as we shall see with corresponding facts and figures in the historical context of this story, in the [chapter 23](#). That is how several thousands of those thus fired people found themselves with no job and not knowing what else to do, overnight. For the war had used about all of them to do violence and dirty tricks against the Germans and French who had collaborated with the latter, and to lead a life of the adventurous and daredevil sort. These behavioral characteristics made them unfit to retrain in another public service or to start a new and peaceful life in the private sector. Many of them saw no difficulty in starting a criminal career. However, as they had been made knowledgeable in spycraft, the [SDECE](#) hired many of them as unofficial and occasional contractors to execute tasks that this agency found too daring and risky, or highly damaging to its image and to the image of France in case of their exposures. Herein I mean things such as physical aggressions and sanctions, burglars, blackmail, racket, procurism, drug trafficking, money counterfeiting, hard interrogation and torture, kidnappings, and assassinations. Soon, the SDECE found itself in the obligation to create a particular service tasked to coordinate and to manage the works of those mercenaries of the most unbridled sort, which was named Service des Opérations Spéciales–SOS (Special Operations Service), in addition to the six services only that this agency had in the 1950s. That is why the SOS was also known as “Service 7,” led by Colonel of the Army Marcel Leroy aka “Leroy-Finville”. The SOS was dismantled in 1965, due to scandal about a political assassination for which this service was the sponsor. Nonetheless, the henchmen the SOS had hired for more than a decade were still there, and they had even recruited and trained others.

In the meantime, in 1958, many such goons of the politically indoctrinated sort had joined the [SAC](#) and the Mouvement Pour la Communauté–MPC (Movement for the Community) led by Pierre Lemarchand, and created in 1959 by Jacques Dauer, Louis Joxe (father of socialist Minister Pierre Joxe), and Louis Schmittlein, to fight the OAS during the Algerian War. It seems that the use of the word “*barbouze*,” to name unflatteringly those violent and ruthless militiamen appeared in the French media shortly after, in 1961. For they were quickly known as responsible in affairs or tortures, assassinations, and bomb plots against the OAS that the Government of De Gaulle ordered unofficially to the SDECE. However, the existence of the *barbouzes* as henchmen of the SDECE resumed after the Algerian War in 1962, and after the SAC was dismantled in 1981, until today and since the SDECE changed its name for DGSE.

The *barbouzes* in the 21st century are numerous and particularly active on the French soil in domestic affairs with executing missions such as blackmailing, burglarizing, bugging places, sabotaging vehicles, threatening targets designated by the DGSE, counterfeiting, drug trafficking, running prostitutes used for honey traps, money-laundering, staging false summary executions in the expectation to make someone confess or cooperate, partaking in *social eliminations*, and *physical eliminations*. Even, some of them are legit police officers. In other words, and to best sum up all this for the American reader, it would not be exaggeration to say that the quality the DGSE expects from a good and reliable *barbouze* is to go by the rules of an exactly opposite version of the Ten Commandments.

Since the 1970s, the missions given to *barbouzes* extend to softer tasks, such as running businesses in France and abroad for various purposes, being locally present to lead *barbouze*’s rings, supervising or assisting sensitive missions and operations occasionally and anonymously, and providing funds and various kinds of illegal assistance. To fulfill the latter needs, the DGSE arranges commonly to settle or to buy sound businesses of the SME type for those mercenaries, presented to them as rewards for their dependability and loyalty on the long run. Those in the latter case are very rarely younger than 35, and they are in their 40s to 60s typically. If *barbouzes* often

seem to enjoy the comfortable standing of the lower upper class, with a typical fancy for black high-end German cars and bourgeois houses, many of them vegetate with little paid activities of the menial sort. Would the reader be surprised, if I reveal that some among the latter category of the unfortunate are paid officially as caretakers and operators in crematoriums?

Nonetheless, there are a number of typical features in the character of all *barbouzes*, which make them rather easy to recognize. These are their frequent statuses of ex-soldiers in elite units, familiarity with paramilitary operations and with the mores of third-world countries and hardship, their disregard for moral, their uncouth and streetwise attitude and extreme distrust toward others, their lack of education and intellectual refinement, and a number of other little things that soon or late clash with the appearances of normalcy they sometimes struggle to keep. They are unattached people who stay rarely for a lifetime with a same partner. They often express favorable stances toward far-leftism, even when their standards of living and characters are telling the exact opposite without any apparent difficulty in the contradiction.

Having met a number of *barbouzes* along more than two decades and having been given some courses in psychiatry in parallel, I can say that most of those strange bedfellows fill the criteria for a diagnosis of antisocial disorder. However, I found a minority only with narcissistic personality disorder. Thus, the latter pattern makes them different characters of case officers because the *barbouze* is of the mobster type typically, while the case officer is of the con artist type overall. Therefore, the *barbouze* is rarely a toxic personality, all on the contrary to the case officer who invariably is. The *barbouze* always acts on order and does not waste his time with people he does not know, whereas the case officer is looking constantly for opportunities by his own and, not so rarely, for his personal interest, due to his exploitative nature.

Nonetheless, all *barbouzes* are authentically dangerous individuals with complete unconcern for other's demises and sufferings, exactly as case officers are. They have been shortlisted and recruited because of this psychological profile, precisely. Female *barbouzes* are extremely rare or perhaps even inexistent, as I never met any I could identify as such with an absolute certainty. Those whose personality could fit the pattern were partners of male *barbouzes*, only.

INTERNAL STAFF^[93]

Before I name sedentary employees and executives of the DGSE, the reader must know that they are hired and paid for according to the three distinct broad categories of competencies and responsibilities, A, B, and C. This makes a significant difference, for example, with the official 15 grades of the GS pay scale in use in U.S. intelligence agencies. It would not be false to assume that, wholesome, the three letters denote an upper class, a middle class, and a lower class of employees, respectively. Accesses to the B and A categories are conditioned theoretically by the passing of an ordinary university degree or of a public service exam, which entitles the recipient with the much-coveted tenure. The provision is modelled after a French military rule that imposes to recruits to have a baccalaureate degree^[94] at least before entering the officer school, in addition to the passing of summary psycho-technical examination tests. Tenure offers some advantages, such as a guaranty to keep one's job until retirement, a rise of salary, enlarged responsibilities, and some other little perks. As the reader may surmise, the access to this permanent position as official paid by the state is used commonly as bait to coax fresh recruits into submitting to indoctrination and to be zealous people.

A recruit who accessed both tenure and A category ranking obtains them after about five years of hardship, trainings, indoctrination, and very demanding tests. His starting gross monthly salary is in the surrounding of 3,000 euros or about 2,300 euros net and before income tax, and so about 2,000 euros after income tax (about \$2,500). Accessing the A category implies a master degree at the very minimum, and a PhD. or similar preferably. A psychiatrist of the DGSE once told me that one on more than 600 shortlisted candidates succeeds on average.

Accessing the A level does not entirely depend on an outstanding intellectual performance, but rather on a mix of political commitment and exceptional resilience to varied ordeals. The former of the two latter prerequisites is not official at all, and recruits are told nothing about it, as it is out of question that they fake it. Those who fail are offered C categories positions as contractors, regardless of their intellectual capacities and diplomas, indeed, and it is out of question to resign and to backtrack to look for better in the world of the ordinary people outside. That is why those unfortunate recruits take it as a first punishment, obviously, and it is a foretaste of the life of paucity they are going to lead until their last day.

Any C category employee starts his career with the minimum legal monthly gross salary of about 1,500 euros, or 1,150 euros net (about \$1,400), but at least there is no income tax on low salaries in France for the moment in 2019. The DGSE pay system encompasses a set salary plus a little bonus of about 10% as a compensation for varied minor expenses such as transportation.

Not long ago, between April and June 2017, the DGSE took the unprecedented initiative to recruit openly by online ads. In addition to this, at about the same time, the recently created PR service of the DGSE obtained from the mainstream media the publishing of several flattering press articles and television reportages, still in the expectation to fulfill its current and rising need for workforce. Thus, many facts on this agency were publicly revealed, but many others were lies, by omission especially and typically as it was out of question, of course, to do any harm to the image of this agency that is not good already.

The ads lied in a way about the duration of the recruiting process, by rendering vague certain statements. To say, the DGSE specified that the candidates would all earn 3,000 euros “net” a month “upon their recruitment,” which stands off as an attractive income for young workers in France nowadays. In addition, the agency specified a “recruiting time of about five months”.^[95] In reality, the latter time is that of the shortlisting process and does not include the tests of the recruiting processes that I described in the [chapter 3](#). So, the DGSE used deceptively the word *selection* (admission) in lieu of *pre-selection* (shortlisting). Then one of those ads further specified that the recruiting process, that is to say, the real and untold journey that may last up to five years, unfolds as a “role play game”. The latter specific is poorly informative to young unenlightened people though but not false in the absolute, yet deceptive by comparison with the realities I shall explain in this book. In any case, no one is hired in the DGSE after five months only of examination and tests, regardless of the salary. In the most optimistic case scenario to the candidates, they will be “approved” upon a recruiting process spanning two years at the very least, and so as C category employees and not paid the announced salary, therefore. It is out of question to the DGSE to give 3,000 euros a month to each of those 600 future recruits, at the very least because a large majority of upper-scale analysts with years of experience do not earn such a salary themselves. They are ranked B category, typically, and so they earn less than 2,000 euros a month, raw.

Otherwise, the PR campaign focused on the “fight against terrorism” to describe the current missions of the DGSE, save for a short and vague phrase that the Ministry of Defense itself published, stating, “The DGSE opens new recruitments to better protect the security of the national interests and French expatriates”.^[96] Nothing was ever said about intelligence, counterintelligence, and related activities, and thus the agency resumed its denial of the latter missions. However, the DGSE specified the profiles and skills this agency was looking for at that time, mixed with few dubious positions certainly introduced for deception. Those were, quote,

“IT and telecom project managers, database engineers, design & application development engineers, telecoms and IT, core network engineers, project management computer consultants and their assistants, computer security engineers, crypto-mathematicians, programmer analysts, telecom technicians in signal and information systems, linguist operators, translators, editorial analysts (geopolitics, financial circuits, energy goods, ballistics, etc.), public procurement writers, technical support professions, and supervisory agents [supervisors]”.

Overall, all specialties above are indicative of an important need for staffers working in telecommunications interception, which is true and even largely known today, as we shall see in detail in the [chapter 22](#), dedicated to [COMINT](#). Further, the ads, and some press articles said that 600 new positions were to be filled by 2019. A few months later, a TV reportage broadcast on *M6* TV channel said that the [DGSI](#) recruited massively too, with a first objective of 1,200 new staffers.

One of the biggest challenges the DGSE has to face since the early 2000s in particular, is to hire enough brained staffers to collect, decipher, translate, and analyze the enormous amount of raw data it intercepts on submarine telecommunication optical fiber cables. As this is so difficult and expensive to do, France has been forced to collaborate with Germany in her very large-scaled COMINT ambitions and program, expected to be operational in the 2020s. Again, the maps illustrating the [chapter 22](#) on French COMINT will allow the reader to grasp the important capacities of the DGSE in this area.

Back to the general subject of DGSE staffers, a number of those who prove unable to access tenure may remain unofficial contractors for three years, typically, sent to work in intelligence units and cells with a cover activity in the private or public sector in the context of the privatization of the services I previously described. A number of them who all believe they failed, later are offered

opportunities in public or private companies or in NGOs in France or abroad, for it is out of question to leave them on their own after they learned secret knowledge. Many of those who succeed, and access tenure, come to realize at some point that the job is not as attractive as they figured initially. This is an unexpected and complete reversal of situation in the eyes of those few selected. As surprising as it may seem, many outsiders of the DGSE know much more than what many of its insiders do, contrary to what they assume and provided they are smart enough to access the “privilege”.^[97]

In general, French intelligence agencies and the police and the [Gendarmerie](#) alike do not give permanent official statuses to individuals who do not seem to be fully at ease and compliant enough to work for long in a highly secured and very demanding professional environment. Sometimes, they are fired because it appears they would be of greater usefulness elsewhere, and with an entirely different specialty. This is in one of those circumstances that failure turns out to be blessing in disguise. As long as a recruit demonstrates his good will and does not make any mistake, then he is not going to fall in [disgrace](#) just because he is unfit to a specialty and a position that someone he does not know had chosen for him, especially when he demonstrated both extraordinary tenacity and strong leftist commitment.

The DGSE holds the extraordinary power to arrange for a recruit of particular interest to obtain a diploma for him, regardless of his performance in a school or university. One of my ex-colleagues who studied at the École Nationale d’Administration–ENA, Paris, failed her final examination. However, she was offered to get her diploma, nonetheless, provided she would do one parachute jump, and that is how she graduated. In a certain sense, anyone graduated at the ENA can be seen as a zealous servitor of the State; the same remark applies to other school Polytechnique, as both are much socialist in spirit.

French intelligence agencies organize internal concours allowing their employees to access a superior ranking category, as in the military. Often, in this other case, concours and their outcome are arranged in advance, unbeknownst to the concerned student themselves.

Any would-be-recruit approved for running for an executive position in the DGSE must submit to a long additional psychiatric examination, carried out by a psychiatrist expert with a knowledge in intelligence activities and specialties. When this particular physician approves the recruit, he has enough authority to submit a recommendation on what the latter is able to do and should not be expected to do. For example, “Is this recruit rather a character of the outgoing sort, likely to be a good agent abroad, or a sedentary and introverted intellectual who will feel perfectly at ease as analyst working every day in a small office?” Or else, “Do his moral values make him fit to work in intelligence in partnership with spies, or rather in security or counterintelligence to catch spies and terrorists?” That is not yet all, as there are the discreet tests and examinations done unbeknownst to the recruit, very numerous, as earlier explained in the [chapter 3](#).

The employee in intelligence. There are in the DGSE two distinct types of insiders: the *contractuels* (contractors) who work inside the DGSE for a term of three years, and the *titulaires* (tenured) who remain working in this agency for a much longer period or until retirement. In DGSE’s technical and administrative jargon, the former are called *agents contractuels* (contractor agents), and the latter *agent titularisés* (tenured agents). Some call them *fonctionnaires contractuels* (officials under contract) and *fonctionnaires titularisés* (tenured officials) respectively. Both uses are correct, and they imply an administrative perception of the trade of intelligence. For the average DGSE employee is hired first as contractor, and then he can obtain his tenure through a concours if he is proposed the opportunity, about as in any other ordinary French public services. Then some of those concours such as that of intelligence analyst are specific to the DGSE, of course.

Things are a little different to those who are hired under military status, since they simply are administratively *mutés* (transferred) from one ordinary military unit to another that is less so. The employee under military status enjoys the privilege to be called “non-commissioned intelligence officer” or “intelligence officer,” which always sounds more flattering and promising than “official” or “agent”. Besides, the DGSE has the power to make any ordinary soldier a commissioned officer with whatever rank overnight, up to lieutenant colonel, as we will see later in this book with a true example.

In passing, if my reader wants to call me “Lieutenant colonel,” “General,” or “Doctor,” then I would not mind as the three have no real value in France, in the absolute. Once in the 1980s, France indeed awarded the Legion d’Honneur to a dog—I am not kidding. To say, in 2012, I published a book under the pen name “Lieutenant-colonel X,” and it has a good overall note of close to five

stars on Amazon.fr from more than 80 comments since; that is to say, much better than the autobiographies of all former directors of the DGSE and other “ex-senior executives” of this agency to date. In truth, I always remained a first class private, and I do not have even the equivalent of a high school degree as I left school at thirteen with the lowest note among close to 1000 students. This was in no way a handicap to me when I gave conferences in reputed schools. I was even given a black belt in street fighting when I once lost the yellow one that I always had from the first day of my training.

All the civilian employee or even executive can do against this discrimination in perception between military and civilians is to say that he is a “C,” “B” or “A” contractor or tenured agent (*“agent titulaire de catégorie A”* to name the most enviable of these three possible levels of responsibility), with corresponding salaries. Then he can be *Chef analyste* (Chief Analyst) or *Chef d’Unité* (Chief of Unit) or *Chef de Service* (Chief of Service) between other examples, and past a number of years of experience, of course. Then the salaries of all those employees can know slight raises according to their years of experience in their respective ranking categories. As I earlier explained, raising up the ladder depends largely on the approval of the Security Service, always based upon unclear and sensitive criteria, among which sincere and tested leftist political commitment counts for much.

To be hired in the DGSE does not change much to the military, and he may work in this agency for a few years as contractor either; he, too, must pass a concours to obtain his tenure. Military who do not access tenure may be called or proposed to go to work in another intelligence agency such as the [DRM](#), the [DRSD](#), the GIC, or even the more enviable [SGDSN](#) where employees with an above-the-average IQ and who are rather fit for a desk job often end up. Civilian *contractors* may rather go to work in the [DGSJ](#) or in another intelligence agency, but also in the SGDSN for the same reasons as above. Civilians and military alike may be “sent” to work in a private or public civilian company, often in human resources or in security, or even in a particular NGO, such as the UNO, the UNESCO, or the OECD, in France or abroad. Some may be sent to work abroad in some French private subsidiaries. In the latter case, they obtain by the same occasion an unofficial position such as [contact](#), agent, or [case officer](#). There they can monitor the recruitments of local engineers and executives who are of interest to the DGSE as [sources](#), for example, or they may enlighten the managerial staff with intelligence sent from Paris, so that the company they work for garners better chances to succeed against its local and foreign competitors. Or else they may be sent to work for a foreign company through particular arrangements, which other situation makes them *agent d’infiltration* (“penetration agents” aka “infiltration agents”). If ever they prove able to stay in such foreign companies, then they will become *agent en place* (agents in place). The luckiest among all may become *super-agents* (same orthography and meaning in English).

The DGSE recruits formally people in the aim to make them field employees, such as [flying agents](#) or [case officers](#), from the start. In the latter case, those must submit to thorough trainings, which include the teaching of tips and tricks in spycraft to be explained all along this book. Operatives expected to be trained thoroughly in intelligence and to be sent abroad, and case officers alike, are politically indoctrinated in France, but they were shortlisted for their left-leaning stances first. The DGSE does not thus select, trust, and train, individuals who stand for the two extreme ends of the political spectrum, nor exponents of rightist values in general.

Many future agents deemed fit to be field agent abroad and infiltration agents are trained in spycraft in the foreign country where they must settle successfully first, or in another place elsewhere in the World prior their sending working in real situation in a target country. A flying agent may be sent to learn additional knowledge and skills, chiefly a foreign language, in one or several countries before he is sent in the country where he must carry on serious intelligence activities. On the same occasion, his loyalty, natural inclinations, abilities, and skills are discreetly monitored, and he is put to the test again, in real situation this time.

In all instances, training a flying agent or a case officer is a long process that takes several years, and this duration depends of the difficulty and interest of his future missions, and on his qualities, of course. For he must go through varied and repeated ordeals simultaneously, which aim to hardening him and, again, to put his loyalty and stamina to the test. All this may easily take five to ten years of hardship and learning, yet for a disappointing outcome from the point of view of the recruit. In most instances, he will be cheaply rewarded and paid, regardless of his skills, intellectual capacities, and education. Exceptions to the latter rule exist, but they remain scarce because they often concern heirs of influential families. A large majority of flying agents is recruited in military elite units and is retrained eventually to carry on intelligence activities in civilian environment and in the industrial

and business sectors. In any case, entering the DGSE upon a debut in a military elite unit often proves to be a determining over all civilian recruits. The winning combination for success in the DGSE is experience in a military elite unit, in addition to sincere and tested commitment to socialism and anti-Americanism, well above all diplomas and any high IQ.

Many French field agents are foreigners who were recruited either while they were living in France, or abroad. The DGSE is looking for recruits of the latter type because the advantages they offer are to be fluent in one or several foreign languages, and to be less likely to be framed as French spies by foreign counterespionage agencies. Among some examples, I may cite that of the foreigner who enlisted in the [Foreign Legion](#) upon his arrival in France, for an individual in this situation knows little about life in this country since he experienced a military life in a secluded middle. Therefore, he will be thought less likely to be spotted and framed by a foreign counterespionage service when he will settle abroad. Such field agents may be given fictitious foreign or French identities (*identité fictive*) after a minimum mandatory term of service of five years.

The **analyst**, or *intelligence analyst*, (*analyste*, in French) is doing a desk job exclusively. The role of analyst is to monitor the activities of a country, an industrial sector, an economic and / or financial sector (macroeconomics, political economy) or finance in general (banks and financial markets), military issues and military industry and engineering. This list is far from to be exhaustive.

The analyst collects and consults the latest information on the field that the intelligence agency trained him to study, that is to say one hundred pages a day on average, and he surrenders a note de synthèse (synthesis note) of his analysis to his Chief Analyst. At the lowest level (*first instance analysis*), the analyst is just skilled and smart enough to make the [mise-au-clair](#) of raw data and intelligence he is fed with daily. At a higher level, his educational background allows him to spot with pertinence interesting bits of information, to make deductions, and to draw inferences from this gathering of intelligence comprising about 90% of open sources at the very least, and 10% of closed sources in the best of cases. This better skilled analyst is a researcher-specialist, in the facts. The raw data and intelligence that an analyst receives daily come from varied sources. The *closed sources* are stolen by agents or intercepted by the [COMINT](#) and [IMINT](#) branches of the DGSE, and the 90% or generally more *open sources* are a flow of information publicly and daily released in the media and books, on the Internet, and on reports. However, a small part of this open source is “gray information” that the public cannot easily access although it is not highly sensitive or has not been formally classified.^[98] Analysts learn—and so the reader, too—that not so seldom the pertinent gathering and careful synthesis of a batch of open sources may lead indeed to the discovery of highly sensitive intelligence. This is possible on condition of course that they hold a basic knowledge allowing them to determine what is highly likely to be true, what can possibly be true, and what is highly unlikely to be true, mere supposition, disinformation, hoax, or irrational statement based on mere beliefs.

That is why the good analyst must have the sound mind of a Sherlock Holmes, shaped by rationality and relying on logic exclusively, while he must equally take into account that people at all levels of the society, that is to say, up to political leaders, happen to make important decisions based on false information, beliefs, dogmas, and poorly supported assumptions. Herein the analyst must have a mind entirely different of that of most sources and many agents who, on the contrary, base their decisions and actions on beliefs, dogmas, deceptive assumptions, or personal agendas. To any intelligence agency, the latter conditions entail the dilemma of a necessary logic and rationality that seldom is compatible with the equally necessary ideological commitment and patriotism of the candidate shortlisted to become an analyst, since all commitments and all patriotisms are based on myths and narratives irrational in essence.

Generally, analysts do not know the real identities of the human sources they receive intelligence from, yet they must be provided with enough clues on their reliability, or else they may guess which hierarchical positions and responsibilities they hold by relying on deductive reasoning at the very least.

The rule of the [need-to-know](#) says that that the case officer or the agent know who their *sources* are. As a source abroad is an asset who can be very valuable, the number of individuals who know his true identity are reduced to a minimum—his *handler* alone, actually. The latter information is kept in a safe in case the *handler* dies unexpectedly, is affected by an incapacitating illness, or is replaced by another.

The analyst, however, may be invited to interview [contacts](#) and even agents who live in the country of which he is a specialist, on occasions of their tripping to France for example. In the mid-1990s, I once saw the interview by a group of specialists of a young French agent who worked in the United States for Pixar Animation Studios. Later in my career, as strategist, I interviewed several nationals who worked in the United States in the computer industry, as computer developers or company managers—I will tell about those people and meetings in the [chapter 27](#) on French intelligence activities in the United States.

Actually, as far as I could see and understand, the rules defining compartmentalization between *sources* and agents on one side, and the DGSE and its staffs on the other side, are not exact and invariable, and rather variable geometry in the facts and on a case-by-case basis. In other words, the level of secrecy surrounding the identities of *sources*, agents, and *contacts*, is defined according to informal criteria that depend on arbitrary decisions, considerations, assumptions, tactical or political decisions, accidental or deliberate leaks inside the agency, or whatever else. All this makes me saying that a *source* is running the risk that his anonymity be compromised at any time, completely unbeknownst to him and contrary to all promises of safety that he may have been made in this regard.

As in all intelligence agencies in the World, the quality of intelligence for long is ranked with an alphanumeric code, defined by a matrix with a letter in abscissa for the quality of the *source*: from A (*trusted*) to F (*reliability unknown*). The number in ordinate gives the value of the information: from 1 (*confirmed*) to 6 (*non-evaluable accuracy*). Thus, if the *source* is a general or a minister, the odds for a piece of information he gave be ranked “A1” are elevated, whereas a *source* who claims “He has free access to the Minister personally” without further evidence of the privilege may be ranked as low as “F6,” possibly. As about a *source* who is a mid-level manager at the headquarters of a foreign intelligence agency, the information he provides is likely to be considered as [enfumage](#) (deceit / “chicken-feed”) in the context of a deception operation, so “F6,” too, or perhaps “E3” in the best of cases. Often, an intelligence agency distrusted mistakenly a sincere *source* who gave highly valuable information. The case of Fritz Kolbe during the WWII is the best historical example of such mistakes.

Then the value of intelligence in the DGSE (and in the DRM) is otherwise roughly noted on *synthesis notes* in percentage of reliability and according to the following increments, starting down from “*non-recoupé*” (“not cross-checked”), to 50%, 80%, to 100% reliable, thus simplified once the value of a *sensor* (*source* or agent) has been established according to the previously explained matrix system. In this respect, the cross-checking of a piece of intelligence itself has a value that is conditioned by the diversity of the sources of information. This means that two different *sources* giving a same information does not offer any guarantee of reliability if both are working in a same body such as a ministry or a military headquarter, and that the validity of this information must be cross-checked by comparing it with what says a *source* working in another body or with other consistent facts. Intelligence is not an exact science, but a help to make an opinion and a decision, which often implies a share of uncertainty.

If he is a specialist in a country or region, the analyst must have been there physically, long enough to be a familiar and to figure out with accuracy what his [sources](#) are telling; exactly as being an analyst specialized in aeronautics entails the prerequisite to be an engineer in this field or to have a consistent professional experience in it, obviously. Then the analyst may go back to this country occasionally, as tourist and without doing any espionage activity since it is not his job. For he must have enough and fresh insight to put the information he receives in its right context, social, cultural, economic, historical, and present. Five years only or even less are enough for a country to change considerably in many respects and to mislead the analyst in his appraisal of the possible consequences of an event.

Anecdotally, since most chief analysts have a cover activity of university professor or think-tank specialist / expert, it is very frequent in France to see them being interviewed on television about a conflict that just broke out, on the outcome of a popular election in a given country, on terrorism, or else. None of them introduces himself as “intelligence analyst in the DGSE,” of course. I even saw some being regularly interviewed on foreign TV channels, in Switzerland in particular. Many of those experts publish essays on the subjects they work on. Some French publishing houses are well known (internally in the DGSE) for their willingness to publish books written by intelligence analysts, such as Éditions L’Harmattan, Editions Ellipses, Editions Economica, Les Éditions Lavauzelle, and Éditions La Découverte.^[92]

The analyst often is recruited “in the civilian” upon his graduation in an ordinary school or university or in the military, about indifferently. Since the 1990s, the French intelligence community opened several schools and universities teaching intelligence matters and the specialty of intelligence analysis, as we have seen earlier.

In any case, an analyst in the DGSE submits to discreet examination and assessment (background checking for him and even his relatives, friends, possible vices, etc.), and to various tests ran unbeknownst to him. If this first evaluation is positive, then he must submit to formal psychological and psychiatric examinations, simply because his expected acumen must not be biased in any way: so, no belief in UFO, World conspiracies, ghosts, astrology, and the like. “Conventional” religious beliefs are “just tolerated” however as they are inescapable. Investigating on Muslim terrorist activities are better conducted by someone who is a Muslim himself. A small minority of specialists on the United States is Christian believer—only one of my ex-colleagues was, and he was not analyst.

The recruit expected to be analyst is asked his opinions about intelligence and spying, of course, and his loyalty to his country and morality are put to the test. Finally, he is called to pass an entry examination as analyst, which may be considered as a formality since the real aim of this ultimate ordeal is to introduce him to his future job.

Country analysts often are second and even sometimes first-generation immigrants, since they must be fluent in their languages, especially when the latter are rare or of the “exotic” sort. Preferably, they must even know slang words, local dialects, and local cultural particularisms and mores. If he becomes a country / region analyst, then he must learn *realpolitik* in general and on the country that he will be supposed to know “by heart.” Political realities as reported by the media seldom tell that such or such country is ruled secretly by another, unbeknownst to its entire population. The result of it being that the opinions and ambitions of their puppet political leaders must be relativized, therefore, let alone the media of this country that are even more misleading in this respect—though foreign propaganda and disinformation may betray true aims and concerns of interest.

In spite of the fact that second instance analysis is a highly specialized professional activity requiring a solid cultural and academic background, the entry salary in the specialty is the minimum official French wage, plus a small bonus and some perks common to all French intelligence office workers. The perks are not very attractive as their purpose actually is to balance a low purchase power common to all French intelligence workers, especially when they work in Paris. For example, still in the early 2000s, there was a special discount store located in the Northeastern part of Paris, near the ring road, where DGSE workers went to shopping because it is located not far from the headquarters of the DGSE. In addition, there are regular Groupon-like unofficial purchase opportunities on various goods, new and “pre-owned,” ranging from wine to appliances, computers, clothing, etc. Otherwise, at the same period, the word was given to buy one’s groceries in Leader Price discount stores in particular!

With the exponential growth of computer technology and of the Internet and online information and telecommunications, intelligence analysis has been relying increasingly on online computer automated search of data, data mining and statistics, and artificial intelligence to process very large quantities of raw intelligence (textual, vocal, and pictorial) daily stored in large computer servers. The pertinence and accuracy of these new research tools vary according to the nature of the studied subject. With respect to politics, macro-economy, and foreign affairs, all deductive reasoning and forecasts still depend on the analysis of decisions and predictions taken by leaders, experts, and advisers, who remain dependent themselves on their own perceptions and misperceptions in international politics. Moreover, History abounds in cases of decisions and actions, whose responses logically immediate yet were delayed unexpectedly for very varying durations. Then, in many of those occurrences, such delays were long enough to see accidental and influential other events happening in the meantime, which either precipitated the expected responses, cancelled, or delayed them. For any decision-making in the aforesaid fields may also be influenced considerably by random events of natural origin, unpredictable, therefore, but that must taken into account either.

Those unpredictable events and completely random incidents each may be rare to the point that some “never occurred before”. The number of those that are already known and provisioned, and their equally known—if ever—lesser or greater probability to occur together result in the highly likelihood to influence or even to elicit political and economic decisions, and spontaneous social upheavals. Actually, this accidental factor has been formally and recently (2007) rationalized by Lebanese American statistician and former trader and risk analyst Nassim Nicholas Taleb, under the

name “black swan theory”. From my own initiative and for long, I named it “the unknown factor”. As a general principle, everyone beyond analysts should keep in mind “That is not because we decide to ignore chaos that chaos is going to forget us”. Then the French intelligence community continues, nonetheless, to rely on the all-human parameter of insight supported by mere intuition; that is to say, in an unpredictable way, ironically. Intuition is taken very seriously in the DGSE.

To sum it all up, not all politics and economics are necessarily rational and / or predictable. General trends in the society, international in their nature and scope, and whose existences, courses, and evolutions are well known and seem inescapable, remain themselves likely to be stopped abruptly at any time by such variables, as History teaches us again. That is why the chain of the above-enumerated variables in political, economic, and social forecasting makes intelligence analysis an uncertain task that cannot qualify as science.

The **Chief Analyst** (*Chef Analyste*) is considered a genuine expert about a country, a region of the World, or of a scientific or technical field. Typically, he is a former university lecturer or currently is a scientist, a historian specialist, an aeronautic engineer, etc. He is ranked at an executive level in reason of his great knowledge in his specialty, and he demonstrated his ability to seeing the overall picture of a given problem in a weighted way, in addition to his outstanding analytical ability. However, in the DGSE, all such qualities and abilities are not necessarily rewarded accordingly. His specific expertise and his intelligence, above the average, must enable him to evaluate with the greatest possible accuracy the validity of the synthesized information (refined intelligence) that his analysts process for him. For intelligence on a given subject that the DGSE collects from various sources often is incomplete and / or inaccurate in varying respects. As the archaeologist who has to figure the missing part of a drawing on an old broken pottery, the Chief Analyst must have a large knowledge in his specialty to be right on the nature of the missing part of an information. In point of fact, intelligence analysts in the DGSE liken themselves collectively to “archaeologists;” they learn formally this perception of their trade, indeed.

Finally, the recognized expertise of the Chief Analyst allows him to formulate an opinion on what consequences the intelligence he has collected may have on the more or less long term, a task that is not so remote from that of a strategist. In other words, he must be capable to formulate highly likely guesses and forecasts whenever possible, and so he must be much more qualified than an analyst is.

The **Strategist** (*stratège*) is many persons at the same time and he often is a polymath. He is a privileged worker who is in touch with numerous people of the intelligence community. That is why he hardly perceives himself as an “insider”. He often is perceived as a character not to say an eccentric because what is perceived as eccentricity with him truly is his particular intellectual capacity to formulate thought-provoking questions, statements, and ideas, which may go as far as to questioning the tenets of the intelligence agency he is working for, dangerously for his career at times. Paradoxically, the oft-encountered problem with the strategist is his capacity to see the general picture of a situation, and his innate and unabashed mania to question every statements that are not supported by indisputable premises, for the latter characteristic shelters him from accepting at their face values all dogmas his intelligence agency preaches. Therefore, he hardly fits in the mold as his colleagues and superiors do, who owe their admissions and positions to this blind acceptance of the current state of things, and to their willingness to enforce it further, precisely. The exceptional freedom of thought the strategist enjoys owes in part to the cautious unwillingness of his superiors to let him for too long staying in touch with people of a same intelligence unit, and in part to their will to try his capacities in other fields where problems also are waiting for their solutions. Unavoidably, the latter practice clashes with usual provisions in the compartmentalization of sensitive knowledge since it violates the sacrosanct internal rule of the *need-to-know*.

In the DGSE, the solutions that have been found to solve the tricky problem of hiring full time strategists are either to let them be outsiders working under whatever cover activity, or to dismiss them at a point where it is considered that “they know too much already,” and to send them working in another governmental agency or private company having ties with the intelligence community close enough to resume their monitoring. Or else to succeed one way or another in bending them into giving to the rules and tenets of the agency, which will bias their recommendations, therefore.

[100]

Among the special provisions taken to limit the access of an individual to too many sensitive matters at the same time or along a career, employees and executives in intelligence who consult strategists are instructed to formulate their questions and problems in veiled or metaphoric terms. Thus, they substitute names and things with slightly different others to elicit hypotheses, ideas and concepts only, for wants of exact and precise responses to their real yet highly sensitive problems.

The strategist in intelligence is not informed of the results of his works, with as consequence not to let him learn from his mistakes. Thus, if ever he is dismissed, he will never know why exactly

I should admit honestly at this point of my explanation, that those think tanks in intelligence, similar to those in common existence in the United States since the creation of the Rand Corporation in 1948, did not yet exist in France when I left. For all I know, or rather I guessed at that time, this absence owed mainly to an obscure question of intellectual elitism considered as incompatible with the left-leaning culture of the French intelligence community. Additionally, the idea of think tanks was perceived as “too American,” as I was once told unambiguously. Moreover, the DGSE was reticent with making several strategists working together. I knew however of the existence of a group of six thinkers who worked outside of the DGSE, officially paid for by the French telephone and Internet company Orange.^[101] Today, as far as I can see, the French intelligence community at last surrendered to the obviousness of the profits that “private” and independent-minded think tanks may yield. Their number seems to be steadily rising, even.

Another tricky question, which the DGSE for long acknowledges as such, at least, is the natural impossibility to train someone—an analyst, for example—to become a strategist, however wondering about this may seem stupid. The talent-spotters of the DGSE are quick to identify them because they know which of their recurring patterns in characters are. This intelligence agency is deploying consistent efforts in its endeavors to find out and to hire such workers. It began to surrender to this other evidence not until the late 1980s, apparently. Before the happening of this change, it stuck to an informal rule saying that a trusted strategist could not be someone else than a scholar coming from a good social middle. All other candidates having the intellectual traits of a thinker were dismissed and regarded with contempt as “jacks of all trades” and “Mr. Know-it-all”.^[102] I understand that some may question the latter remarks, but they derive from what I witnessed and experienced firsthand for years.

The **Chief of Service** (*Chef de service*) leads the staff of a service under the direct responsibility of a directorate,^[103] itself placed under the administrative supervision of a director of directorate. He often is a former commissioned officer in one of the three main military branches (Army, Navy, or Air Force), or sometimes a former gendarme, police officer, civilian engineer, or even a scientist. He may also have been a lawyer or a judicial officer. In all cases, he has been immersed for long in a bureaucratic middle and he is a national. He owes his managerial position partly to his thorough knowledge of the service’ specialty he leads, previously acquired through experience, and partly to his ability to manage large staffs and to perform multiple and varied tasks simultaneously. Of course, he preferably is a self-assertive and charismatic individual, the latter fact implying he must command individuals (chiefs of units) who may be more competent than he is in the considered branch. Usually, he entered the intelligence agency and his service, or another one, early in his career. Necessarily too, he has a sincere passion for what he is doing, and that is why he is always in close and permanent touch with his subordinates, ready to fix any problem at any time. In sum, the Chief of service must have the profile of a charismatic military group leader, although he has a mix of military and civilian workers under his command.

The Chief of service comes often from the little bourgeoisie of the middle class, and so he did not have to work and to borrow money to buy his home. In point of fact, those heirlooms will dissuade him from attempting to defect, if ever such an idea comes to his mind—he would have no hope to recover all this or to enjoying it anymore after that. Individual property, and real estate more especially, are important in the eyes of the DGSE when this agency is envisaging to promote someone to an executive or sensitive position. The latter fact is true because this ownership calls for a material bond in addition to family, *i.e.* a stake that constitutes a serious motive of loyalty. In the DGSE, however, making somebody the owner of his home is a thing that can be arranged easily and very quickly, as I saw it several times.

Nonetheless, this senior executive is equally aware that chances for a chief of service to access a directorial position one day are next to nothing. For to be named director of a directorate or director of the DGSE depends on quite different and sometimes odd considerations, once more defined and decided by the Security Service above anyone else, and despite official claims that the political apparatus alone would decide of who occupy these senior positions.

The **Director of directorate** (*Directeur de direction*) is an individual who began his career at a relatively young age, either in intelligence, the military, diplomacy, sciences and technology, or in another public service—this enumeration is not exhaustive—, upon his completion of postgraduate

studies in a large majority of instances. He never climbed the ladder by sheer arduous work in the directorate he commands, contrary to the Chief of Service who is his direct subordinate.

As for his experience in intelligence, he acquired it either in the military or when he worked as diplomat with the Ministry of Foreign affairs, as director of research in a scientific civilian body, or as *Chef de poste* abroad ([Chief of Station](#)). In sum, he acquired a strong experience in management above all, and in close and permanent touch with highly minded and educated people exclusively, yet outside the intelligence agency where he is working. Of course, he is the owner of a significant real estate heritage.

His senior executive position in intelligence has been planned. That is why his professional career was oriented so that he could acquire all necessary knowledge to the perfect fulfillment of his managerial functions as quickly as possible.^[104] My American reader would rightly say, he was “on the fast track” from the inception.

The Director of directorate is not at all in direct and permanent touch with the staff of the service(s) under his command, but outside of it, and again because of the rule of compartmentalization. He is working at the headquarters, in the directorial building with the directors of the other directorates, and with the Director of the Agency with whom he is in daily touch. This particular provision must allow quick concerted decisions, actions, and responses, under the command of the Bureau of the Director and his Deputy Director and assistants.

The **Director of the DGSE** is officially chosen and appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Ministry of Defense and approval of the [DRSD](#).^[105] Frequently, he was picked up when he was still a high-ranking officer in the military (General, Admiral). In the course of his experience in the military, he became familiar with the subject of intelligence (military in his case), and in touch with the DRM and the DGSE, and about what is called “special operations,” *i.e.* the sending of elite troops abroad in contexts of more or less discreet military and paramilitary interventions in certain countries—African in most instances—and in the other contexts of armed interventions under UNO / NATO command.

It may also happen that the Director has been an official of the diplomatic corps, which middle allowed him to become familiar with intelligence issues, to meet regularly with French and foreign intelligence officers, and to acquire great expertise in foreign relations and *realpolitik*. In addition to all this, he has been solicited frequently in various, subtle, and insidious ways to betray his country, a professional inconvenience and multiple pitfalls he proved able to overcome. Some were Intelligence [Chief of Station](#) abroad. Finally, he offers as additional guarantee of his loyalty the possession of a personal fortune, inherited in a large majority of cases, which binds him firmly to his country.

The reader may be tempted to conclude that the DGSE is articulated around a pyramidal hierarchy that is altogether classic. Actually, things are more complex than that, and they are even complicated by the fact that one should take into account the French-German partnership in intelligence, and most of all the highly influential and tricky special French-Russian relationship.

As I said, the DGSE is largely influenced by the Russian approach to intelligence, and this explains why this agency commonly accepts the notion of “generalist,” exactly as in the other sector of medicine that commonly accepts generalist physicians, although hospitals are compartmentalized in highly specialized services either. In those hospitals, we also find generalists with no definite specialties in particular areas, who yet do not hold managerial positions. In the DGSE, a similar culture may extend to about all levels of its organization because it is welcomed and even expected. When this agency recruits someone, its skills, particular areas of knowledge, and intellectual capacities together defines in which branch he will be directed to learn more, train, and work to become a highly specialized expert ultimately or a brilliant generalist. [COMINT](#) tends to breed a majority of highly specialized professionals, whereas [HUMINT](#) engenders generalists naturally.

Recruits with no definite particular area of knowledge begin their career as “generalists,” though not necessarily. Then, they are stirred at some point to a specialty for which they appear to have affinities, usually: a country in particular, security and counterespionage, influence and disinformation, etc. There are two broad categories of recruits: those such as engineers who graduated in very particular areas, and those with a diploma of similar significance but rather generalist in essence, such as political science as it frequently happens. Some specialize for a while in a particular area, and then become bored by it and specialize again in an entirely different branch. A minority among them never specializes definitively.

However, from the viewpoint of the Security Service that much matters, the status of *generalist* poses a problem with respect to the compartmentalization of sensitive knowledge. That is why generalists do not stay for long full-time employees in the DGSE. Many become exterior consultants with no clear status, either individually as member of a think tank or of some front organization. Those particular people are gifted because if they were not, then they would be imposed a specialty from authority.

The apparent paradox with those generalists is that together they indeed exert great influence on the policy, procedures, missions and operations, strategy, and future orientations of the main missions of the DGSE, although they are not formally bestowed upon any clear responsibilities and rank other than a high *awareness degree*. The latter particularity, which one may see as a sign of disorganization or loophole, is integral to the doctrine of active measures in reality, so that an enemy has a hard time with finding out who are the spymasters and the brains.

Notwithstanding, the point with this system—which is correct—is that a capacity for commanding and leading does not necessarily goes on a par with a matching ability to see the overall picture of problems and to find out weighted solutions. Otherwise, the largest industrial companies would use MENSA as their favorite recruiting pool to find out their managerial staffs.